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tion'to that exclusive list especially in 
light of its earlier unwillingness to in-
clude the more explicitly protected con-
stitutional right of free speech. Id. 
In Bray, the United States Su-
preme Court clarified its current posi-
tion on abortion and in so doing, re-
jected Pro-Choice's latest attempt to 
permanently enjoin Pro-Life demonstra-
tors from blocking the entrances to abor-
tion clinics. The Court found there was 
no latent conspiracy against women as 
a class behind the demonstrations, and 
further refused to recognize that a 
woman's constitutionally protected 
right of interstate travel was infringed 
upon by such demonstrations. While 
this decision is an apparent victory for 
Operation Rescu~, the full impact of 
this decision may never materialize given 
the two recent shootings that injured 
one abortion doctor and killed another, 
coupled with the retirement of Justice 
White, who joined the majority in this 
opinion. 
- John M Oliveri 
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Georgia v. McCollum: CRIMINAL 
DEFENDANTS MAY NOT USE 
PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES 
TO DISCRIMINATE ON THE 
BASIS OF RACE. 
In Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. 
Ct. 2348 (1992), the United States Su-
preme Court held that defendants in 
criminal cases may not use peremptory 
challenges to discriminate against po-
tentialjurors on the. basis ?frace. In so 
ruling, the Court expanded its prohibi-
tion of racially discriminatory uses of 
peremptory strikes beyond the State 
and private litigants to encompass crimi-
na defendants. 
On August 10, 1990, two caucasian 
defendants were charged with the ag-
gravated assault and simple battery of 
two African-Americans. Prior to jury 
selection, the prosecutor moved to pro-
hibit the respondents from using pe-
remptory challenges to discriminate 
against potential African-Americanju-
rors. Both the trial court and the Su-
preme Court of Georgia concluded that 
criminal defendants, unlike civil liti-
gants and criminal prosecutors, were 
pennitted to exercise peremptory strikes 
to racially discriminate, and thus keep 
African-Americans from serving on the 
jury. The United States Supreme Court 
granted certiorari to consider whether 
the prohibition against using peremp-
tory strikes in a racially discriminatory 
manner applied to criminal defendants, 
as well as to the State and civil litigants. 
The Court began its analysis by 
considering whether such use of pe-
remptory challenges by criminal defen-
dants inflicts the same harm on the juror 
and the conmmnity discussed in the 
Batson prohibition on discriminatory 
peremptory challenges by the prosecu-
tion. Id. at 2353 (citing Batson v. 
Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986». In 
concluding that similar harm would arise 
from the use of racially discriminatory 
peremptory strikes by criminal defen-
dants, the Court noted that public dis-
crimination undermines public confi-
dence in the courts and the system as a 
whole. Id. at 2354. Furthermore, the 
Court stressed the importance of public 
trust in the judicial system to maintain 
peace in the community, especially in 
race-related cases. McCollum, 112 S. 
Ct. at 2354. Whether the discrimina-
tion was exercised by the State or the 
defense, the Court concluded that the 
resulting antagonistic feelings towards 
the justice system were the same. Id. 
The Court next addressed whether 
the use of peremptory challenges by 
criminal defendants constituted state 
action under the Equal Protection 
Clause, because state action is required 
under the Fourteenth Amendment in 
order to give rise to a Constitutional 
violation. Id. The Court first looked to 
its analysis in Edmonson v. Leesville 
Concrete Co., III S. Ct. 2082 (1991), 
which inquired into whether strikes arose 
from a right or privilege of state author-
ity. McCollum, 112 S. C1. at 2354. 
Observing that both the right to exer-
cise the strikes and their scope were 
defined by state law, the Court deter-
mined that the use of peremptory chal-
lenges was a state right or privilege. Id. 
at 2355. 
The Court next considered whether 
the defendants could be viewed as state 
actors, so that their actions would be 
considered state actions under the Equal 
Protection Clause. Id. The Court uti-
lized the three prong analysis estab-
lished in Edmonson which examined 
the following: (1) the extent to which 
the actor relied on governmental assis-
tance and benefits, (2) whether the actor 
was performing a traditional govern-
mental function, and (3) whether the 
in ju ry caused was aggravated in a unique 
way by the incidents of governmental 
authority. Id. (citing Edmonson, IllS. 
Ct. at 2083). 
Concluding that the defendants were 
state actors, the Court applied the three 
prong test and noted that the criminal 
defendants had substantially relied on 
governmental assistance and benefits. 
McCollum, 112 S. Ct. at 2355. In 
addition, the pervasive nature of the 
government's involrement in jury se-
lection through state statutes enabled 
the peremptory challenge system to ex-
ist. Jd. 
The Court also found that use of 
peremptory challenges was a traditional 
governmental function. The Court re-
lied on its holding in Edmonson which 
stated that "[peremptory challenges '] 
sole purpose is to pennit litigants to 
assist the government in the selection of 
an impartial trier of fact." ld. (quoting 
Edmonson, IllS. Ct. at 2083). The 
Court found the Edmonson reasoning 
especially persuasive because the se-
lection of a jury for a criminal case 
represents a unique govenm1ental func-
tion and is required by the Constitution. 
McCollum, 112 S. Ct. at 2355. 
With regard to the third prong of the 
analysis, the Court found the injury to 
be aggravated by the incidents of gov-
ernmental authority, further supporting 
the conclusion that a criminal defendant 
is a state actor. ld. at 2356. The Court 
emphasized the intensification of the 
harmful effects caused by the use of 
peremptory strikes in a criminal setting, 
because the removal of a juror is per-
ceived to be an action of the State 
regardless of who actually exercised 
the strike. Jd. 
The Court rejected the respondents' 
argument that a criminal defendant can-
not be acting with govenm1ental char-
acterwhen exercising peremptory chal-
lenges because of the adversarial rela-
tionship between the defendant and the 
prosecution. Jd. The Court explained 
that peremptory challenges occur in the 
context of choosing the "quintessential 
govenm1ental body ... on which our 
judicial system depends." Jd. The 
Court added that "when a govenm1ent 
confers on a private body the power to 
choose the government's employees or 
officials, the private body will be bound 
by the constitutional mandate of race 
neutrality." Jd. (quoting Edmonson, 
III S.Ct. at 2085). In concluding that 
the defendants were state actors, the 
Court found that the use of racially 
discriminatory peremptory strikes by 
criminal defendants was a state action 
which violated the Equal Protection 
Clause. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. at2356. 
Having found the defendants' ac-
tions to be a violation of the Equal 
Protection Clause, the Court then con-
sidered whether the State had third party 
standing to challenge discriminatory uses 
of peremptory strikes. Jd. at 2357. In 
order to raise a claim on behalf ofa third 
party, a litigant must have demonstrated 
that he has suffered a concrete injury, 
that he has a close relation to the third 
party, and that there exists some hin-
drance to the third party's ability to 
protect its own interests. ld. (citing 
Powersv. OhiO, 111 S. Ct. at 1370-71 
(1991)). 
The Court concluded that the State 
has standing to assert a cause of action 
on behalf of the excluded juror. 
McCollum, 112 S. Ct. at 2357. In 
support of its finding, the Court noted 
that a State suffers a cognizable injury 
when the fairness of the judicial system 
is questioned. Jd. The Court empha-
sized the difficulties facing excluded 
jurors seeking to defend themselves and 
the status of the State as the representa-
tive of its citizens as allowing addi-
tional reasons for the State to assert the 
rights of the excluded juror. ld. 
Finally, the Court examined the 
broader issue concerning whether the 
interests of the criminal defendant 
should prevail over the interests of ex-
cluded jurors and the integrity of the 
judicial system. Jd. at 2358. In denying 
the defendants' rights first priority, the 
Court emphasized that peremptory 
challenges are not constitutionally pro-
tected rights, but are created by the 
State to achieve an impartial jury. ld. 
FurthernlOre, the Court rejected the idea 
that a fair trial included a party's right 
to racially discriminate against poten-
tial jurors. ld. The Court detennined 
that the Sixth Amendment rights of a 
criminal defendant were not violated by 
prohibiting racially discriminatory uses 
of peremptory challenges. ld. 
The McCollum decision extends the 
prohibition against the use of racially 
discriminatory peremptory challenges 
from prosecutors and private defen-
dants to criminal defendants. Although 
McCollum may promote fairness in the 
jury selection process, the consequences 
of McCollum could include African-
Americar!., criminal defendants losing 
the right to strike white jurors on the 
basis of race. As a result, African-
Americans and other minorities may 
lose their ability to be judged by a jury 
which includes their peers. 
- Susan Oliveri 
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